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When a population is engaged in successive prisoner’s dilemmas, indirect reciprocity through rep-
utation fosters cooperation through the emergence of moral and action rules. A simplified model has
recently been proposed where individuals choose between helping or not others, and are judged good
or bad for it by the rest of the population. The reputation so acquired will condition future actions.
In this model, eight strategies (referred to as ‘leading eight’) enforce a high level of cooperation,
generate high payoffs and are therefore resistant to invasions by other strategies. Here we show
that, by assigning each individual one out of two labels that peers can distinguish (e.g., political
ideas, religion, skin colour...) and allowing moral and action rules to depend on the label, intolerant
behaviours can emerge within minorities under sufficient economic stress. We analyse the sets of
conditions where this can happen and also discuss the circumstances under which tolerance can
be restored. Our results agree with empirical observations that correlate intolerance and economic
stress, and predict a correlation between the degree of tolerance of a population and its composition
and ethical stance.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge,02.50.Le,89.75.Fb,87.10.Mn
I. INTRODUCTION
Different kinds of discriminatory behaviour based on
membership to different groups—identified, for exam-
ple, by visible tags [1]—has been reported both in hu-
man [2–5] and in animal societies [6–10]. They can
be broadly classified into two main types: in-group fa-
voritism and out-group hostility [11–13]. Recent studies
of in-group and out-group cooperation show that in-group
favouritism can emerge in the framework of indirect reci-
procity [14–16].
The concept of indirect reciprocity [17, 18] has been
introduced to explain the emergence of cooperation in so-
ciety, where many interactions between the same individ-
uals have low chances to be repeated. Contrary to direct
reciprocity [19], indirect reciprocity implies that individ-
uals receive the consequences of their actions, not directly
from their opponents, but indirectly through society. In-
direct reciprocity—and its related reputation concept—
has proven to be an important mechanism for the emer-
gence and sustainment of cooperation in small-scale hu-
man [20–24] and non-human [25] societies. It also plays
an important role in communication networks [26, 27]. In
these reputation-based models, individuals have an opin-
ion about every interaction they witness and assign a rep-
utation to the individuals involved accordingly [21, 28–
31]. The nature of their future interactions with those in-
dividuals will be determined by the reputation they have
assigned to them.
In a stylised model of indirect reciprocity Ohtsuki and
Iwasa [29] and Brandt and Sigmund [30] classified the
strategies involved in these games attending to action and
assessment modules. The action module prescribes what
to do—whether cooperate or not—given the reputations
of the individuals involved. The assessment module as-
signs reputation to the interacting individuals according
to a moral code. To do it three elements can be judged:
the nature of the interaction, the reputation of the re-
cipient, and the reputation of the donor. Strategies are
thus classified as first, second, or third order depending
on whether the first, the first and the second, or all the
three elements are taken into account to assign a reputa-
tion to the donor. Ohtsuki and Iwasa [29] studied the evo-
lutionarily stability of third order strategies which share
the same moral assessment module, and later Martinez-
Vaquero and Cuesta [32] extended the study confronting
strategies with different moral codes. Among the evo-
lutionary stable strategies (ESS) found, there are eight
strategies—the so-called Leading Eight—that are consid-
erably more efficient (get very high payoff) and coherent
(in terms of consistency between their moral and action
modules) than the rest of them. All these strategies foster
cooperation through indirect reciprocity.
This simple model of indirect reciprocity can be read-
ily extended to study the emergence of discriminatory
behaviours by introducing different groups of individuals
identified by external signs (these may include physical
or cultural traits). Our goal in this work is to analyse un-
der which conditions an intolerant strategy (understood
as out-group hostility) can invade a tolerant population
that follows one of the Leading Eight strategies. When-
ever intolerance spreads, we are also interested in whether
tolerance can be restored by introducing some kind of ex-
ternal incentives. Our hope is that this study sheds some
light into the causes for the emergence of intolerance in
societies and the mechanisms to alleviate this social bur-
den.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II we in-
troduce the model, which is mathematically implemented
in section III. Our results are shown in section IV and dis-
cussed in section V.
II. MODEL
Our model is an extension of that used in a previous
work [32]—itself a modification of the indirect reciprocity
model based on reputation introduced by Brandt and Sig-
mund [30] and later investigated by Ohtsuki and Iwasa
[29, 33].
2We consider an infinite, well-mixed population, where
every individual is aware of every action performed and
produces a moral judgment—which leads to a reputation
assignment—on it. Each time step a pair of individuals is
randomly drawn—with equal probability—from the pop-
ulation. One of them plays as donor and the other one
as recipient. The donor can decide to pay a cost c > 0
to help (C) the recipient or not (D). Any helped recip-
ient gains a payoff b > c; otherwise there is no payoff
whatsoever.
This action is observed by every individual in the popu-
lation (including themselves). Thus everyone makes a pri-
vate judgment of the donor for this action. The observer’s
moral assessment will decide the reputation—good (G)
or bad (B)—she assigns to the donor. Accordingly, ev-
erybody has a private opinion of every other individual—
even of herself.
By repeating this process the population eventually
reaches a steady state. The average payoff of this re-
peated game is then computed for every individual. By
assuming a very large population we effectively neglect
direct reciprocity—the probability that two individuals
meet again is very small.
Strategies are defined by two modules: the action rules,
which tells the donor how to interact with the recipient,
and the moral rules, which prescribe a reputation for the
donor of every witnessed action. As in our previous paper
[32], we will consider third order strategies.
The action rules determine what the donor must do
(either help or refuse to help) given the reputation of
both players. Specifically, aαβ = 1 (C) if a strategist
with reputation α helps an individual with reputation β
and 0 (D) otherwise.
The moral assessments tell the individual if the action
just witnessed should be judged good or bad, hence re-
vising the donor’s reputation. Specifically, mαβ(a) = 1
(G) if the observer assigns good reputation to a donor
she previously judged α, who performs an action a on an
recipient she previously judged β, and is 0 (B) otherwise.
Thus each strategy is defined by 12 numbers: 4 for the
action module and 8 for the moral module. This amounts
to 4096 different strategies in total.
Besides, we will assume that players sometimes make
errors when trying to help another individual [29, 34–37].
Thus, with a probability ǫ a donor defects regardless of
her action rules and with 1−ǫ she performs the action she
planned to. One possible source of this error—which will
be important in interpreting the results of this work—is
scarcity of resources. Despite her willingness to help, an
individual may fail to do it because she cannot afford the
cost c. Errors due to misjudgements are excluded (see
[32] for a justification).
Discrimination requires at least two different subpopu-
lations that can be clearly identified by everybody. Thus
we divide our population into two classes, A and B. The
fraction of A individuals will be denoted y. A tolerant
player will act disregarding the individuals’ class when
deciding her action or judgement. An intolerant individ-
ual acts and judges like a tolerant one with the following
exceptions:
1. Individuals of the other class are never helped.
2. Donors of the other class are judged bad under any
circumstance.
3. Individuals of her own class who do not help indi-
viduals of the other class are always judged good.
4. Individuals of her own class who do help individuals
of the other class are always judged bad.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Our goal is to determine, with the assumptions of the
model, under which conditions a small population of in-
tolerant (tolerant) mutants M can invade a tolerant (in-
tolerant) resident population R made of A-type and B-
type individuals in fractions y and 1−y respectively. This
fraction y will be kept constant and is therefore a parame-
ter of the model. We will only consider scenarios where all
individuals of the same class in R show the same kind of
behavior—either tolerant or intolerant—toward the other
class. Likewise, we will limit ourselves to determine when
the resident population can resist the invasion of mutants.
Determining the final composition of the population if the
invasion succeeds is a more complex problem that we will
tackle in this paper.
Without loss of generality, in the following calculations
mutants will be assumed to belong to class A. Likewise,
we will only need to consider whether A-residents imitate
the mutant or not. If a B-resident imitates the A-mutant
(its tolerant or intolerant character) this can be treated
as an invasion of B-residents by a B-mutant separately—
the reason being that mutants are present in so small a
fraction that the probability that two mutants interact is
negligible.
Accordingly the different invasion scenarios will be de-
noted tM |tAtB, where tX can be either T (tolerant indi-
viduals) or I (intolerant individuals), M denotes A-type
mutants, and A and B the two subpopulations. The four
possible scenarios are:
I|TT: intolerant A-mutants try to invade a tolerant pop-
ulation;
T|IT: tolerant A-mutants try to invade a population
made of intolerant A-residents and tolerant B-
residents;
I|TI: intolerant A-mutants try to invade a population
made of tolerant A-residents and intolerant B-
residents;
T|II: tolerant A-mutants try to invade an intolerant pop-
ulation.
The condition for A-residents to resist the invasion of
A-mutants is W (A|R) > W (M |R), where W (A|R) and
W (M |R) are the average payoffs received by A-type resi-
dents and by mutants, respectively. They can be obtained
as
W (A|R) = b ΘR,A − c ΘA,R,
W (M |R) = b ΘR,M − c ΘM,R,
ΘR,A = y θA,A + (1− y) θB,A,
ΘA,R = y θA,A + (1− y) θA,B,
ΘR,M = y θA,M + (1− y) θB,M ,
ΘM,R = y θM,A + (1− y) θM,B,
(1)
where θi,j is the probability that an i-strategist helps a j-
strategist. If i-strategists are intolerant and j-strategists
3belong to a different class θi,j = 0; otherwise these prob-
abilities can be obtained as
θi,j = (1− ǫ)
∑
αβ
χα(g
i
i)χβ(g
i
j)aαβ , (2)
where gji is the fraction of i-strategists that are consid-
ered good by the j-strategists. We have introduced the
auxiliary function
χγ(x) = γx+ (1− γ)(1− x). (3)
Thus if x represent the fraction of good individuals, then
χ1(x) = x and χ0(x) = 1 − x are the fraction of ‘good’
and ‘bad’ individuals, respectively.
In order to calculate the fractions gji we first need to
compute the fractions xΛAΛBΛMi of i-individuals with rep-
utations ΛA, ΛB, and ΛM according to A-residents, B-
residents, and mutants, respectively. Here Λi can be
G (for good reputation), B (for bad reputation), or *
(for any reputation, G or B). For instance, xG∗Bi repre-
sents the fraction of i-type individuals who are considered
good by A-residents and bad by mutants, regardless of B-
residents’ opinion. Hence xG∗Bi =
∑
ΛB
xGΛBBi . Thus
gAi = x
G∗∗
i , g
B
i = x
∗G∗
i , g
M
i = x
∗∗G
i . (4)
It turns out that not all xΛAΛBΛMi are necessary to
compute gji (see Appendix for details). In general, all we
need is to obtain xΛA∗ΛMA , x
ΛA∗ΛM
M , and for some scenar-
ios also xΛA∗ΛMB or x
∗ΛBΛM
B . Since we are considering an
infinite population, self-interactions are negligible. Un-
der the assumption that the rate of mutants is very low,
donors will only interact with residents and therefore the
dynamics of these fractions will be given by
dxΛA∗ΛMA
dt
= y TΛAΛMA,A + (1− y) F
ΛAΛM
A,B − x
ΛA∗ΛM
A , (5)
dxΛAΛB∗B
dt
= (1 − y) TΛAΛBB,B + y F
ΛAΛB
B,A − x
ΛA∗ΛB
B , (6)
dx∗ΛBΛMB
dt
= (1 − y) TΛBΛMB,B + y F
ΛBΛM
B,A − x
∗ΛBΛM
B ,
(7)
dxΛA∗ΛMM
dt
= y TΛAΛMM,A + (1− y) F
ΛAΛM
M,B − x
ΛA∗ΛM
M , (8)
where the interactions with recipients of the same and of
the opposite class have been split into TΛlΛmi,j and F
ΛlΛm
i,j ,
respectively. Fractions FΛlΛmi,j depend on the scenario
we are considering whereas TΛlΛmi,j are common for all of
them and can be obtained as
TΛAΛMi,A =
∑
αAαMβAβM
xαA∗αMi x
βA∗βM
A
×RΛAΛM (αAβA, αMβM |αiβi) (9)
TΛAΛBB,B =
∑
αAαBβAβB
xαAαB∗B x
βAβB∗
B
×RΛAΛB (αAβA, αBβB|αBβB) (10)
TΛBΛMB,B =
∑
αBαMβBβM
x∗αBαBB x
∗βBβM
B
×RΛBΛM (αBβB, αMβM |αBβB) (11)
where RΛlΛm(αlβl, αmβm|αiβi) is the probability that an
i-type donor with reputation (αl, αm) acting on a recip-
ient with reputation (βl, βm), is assigned a reputation
(Λl,Λm). Reputations are as given by l-individuals and
m-individuals respectively. This probability is obtained
as
RΛlΛm(αlβl, αmβm|αiβi) =
= (1− ǫ) δ
(
Λl,mαlβl(aαiβi)
)
δ
(
Λm,mαmβm(aαiβi)
)
+ ǫ δ
(
Λl,mαlβl(D)
)
δ
(
Λm,mαmβm(D)
)
.
(12)
In general, Eqs. (5)–(8) need to be solved numerically.
Nevertheless, for the different scenarios that we will con-
sider, some simplifications can be made. The details are
deserved to the Appendix.
IV. RESULTS
We focus our analysis on the leading eight strategies in-
troduced by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [29]. In a previous paper
[32] we proved that, for reasonable values of benefit-to-
cost and error rates, these eight strategies are evolution-
arily stable against the invasion of any other strategy.
On the other hand, Ohtsuki and Iwasa [29] classified the
leading eight in three groups (Table IV), according to
their stability against invasions by fully defective action
rules (AllD). Neglecting errors in the moral assessment,
Groups I and II can be invaded by AllD provided
b
c
< 1 + ǫ + ǫ2 + · · · =
1
1− ǫ
, (13)
in other words, if the error in the action ǫ > (b − c)/b.
Invading Group III requires b < c though.
Therefore, for a given b > c, if ǫ is sufficiently large, any
Group I or Group II strategy can be invaded by defec-
tors, whereas Group III strategies always resist invasions.
As we will show below, these are the same conditions un-
der which intolerance can spread, but intolerant strate-
gies obtain a higher payoff than AllD because they are
indistinguishable from the strategy used by residents of
their same group. Accordingly, when two distinguishable
groups coexist in a population, intolerant strategies are
preferred over AllD.
In what follows we will consider the different invasion
scenarios for which there exists a parameter region where
invasion occurs. These regions are determined numeri-
cally, and represented in Figs. 1–8 as colored areas in a
ǫ–y plane, where y represents the fraction of A-residents
in the community. For the sake of clarity of the repre-
sentations, we will sometimes assume that the invader is
of type A, and sometimes of type B. Consistent with the
previous section, we will denote tM |tAtB—tX =T,I being
the tolerant/intolerant character of type X individuals—
whenever the mutant is of type A, and tAtB |tM when-
ever the mutant is of type B. (Notice, however, that y
will always represent the fraction of A-residents, which
will coincide with the type of mutants in the former case,
but not in the latter.) Changing the type of mutant will
make analyzing successive invasions I|TT and IT |I —
which would turn a fully tolerant population into a fully
intolerant one— much easier.
4FIG. 1. (Color online.) Values for ǫ and y indicating the different regions where invasions I |TT , T |IT and IT |I are successful
for strategy Ia. Above the horizontal line, also AllD can invade a tolerant population.
FIG. 2. (Color online.) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy Ib.
5mGG(C) mGG(D) mGB(C) mGB(D) mBG(C) mBG(D) mBB(C) mBB(D) aGG aGB aBG aBB
Ia G B G G G B G B C D C C
Ib G B B G G B G B C D C C
IIa G B G G G B G G C D C D
IIb G B G G G B B G C D C D
IIc G B B G G B G G C D C D
IId G B B G G B B G C D C D
IIIa G B G G G B B B C D C D
IIIb G B B G G B B B C D C D
TABLE I. Leading eight strategies. The first eight columns describe the moral assessment; the last four, the action rules.
Strategies are classified into three groups (I, II, and III; see text).
FIG. 3. (Color online.) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIa.
6FIG. 4. (Color online.) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIb.
FIG. 5. (Color online.) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIc.
7FIG. 6. (Color online.) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IId.
FIG. 7. (Color online.) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIIa, with the new invasion scenario II |T .
8FIG. 8. (Color online.) Same as Fig. 7 but for strategy IIIb.
In all invasion scenarios that we will consider, we will
just determine the stability of the resident population
against invasion by mutants, but not the final equilibrium
(hence we do not determine whether there is a turnover of
the invaded population or a final coexistence is reached).
Figures 1–6 correspond to Group I and Group II strate-
gies, whereas Figs. 7–8 correspond to Group III strate-
gies.
The different scenarios are as follows: I|TT , T |IT ,
IT |I, and T |II. Overlaps of these regions are colored
by a mixed color.
First of all, Figures 1–6 show that tolerant commu-
nities that follow Group I and Group II strategies can
be invaded by intolerant individuals (I|TT ) if ǫ is suffi-
ciently high and/or b/c sufficiently low. Minorities are
more prone to undergo such a spread of intolerance. Sec-
ond, if one of the two resident types is intolerant and
the other one is tolerant, intolerant residents can be in-
vaded by tolerant mutants (T |IT ) provided they are a
minority (in all cases that we have analysed y < 0.5).
However, this T |IT region never overlaps with the I|TT
one, so after a spread of intolerance the “economic con-
ditions” must change for tolerance to be restored. Third,
if in a community with tolerant and intolerant residents
the latter are the majority, then this strategy can spread
also among the tolerant residents (IT |I), thus dividing
the community into two separate groups that dislike and
never help each other. And finally, a fully intolerant com-
munity resists invasion by tolerant individuals for any
combination of parameters. Hence, there is no way to re-
store tolerance in a fully intolerant community by tuning
the parameters of the model (but see Section IVA).
If we associate low b/c ratios and high ǫ with strait
conditions, the interpretation emerging from these results
is that economic stress favors the spread of intolerance
within minorities. Once it has invaded a group, toler-
ance cannot be restored unless the economic conditions
improve. And if intolerance has eventually split the com-
munity, not even that can restore tolerance again.
Group III strategies are quite different (Figs. 7–8). A
tolerant population following any of these strategies al-
ways resists the invasions of intolerant mutants regardless
of the parameter setting (i.e., invasion I|TT never hap-
pens). Furthermore, if one type is tolerant and the other
one intolerant in the resident population, tolerant mu-
tants can invade the intolerant residents (T |IT ). Intoler-
ant mutants can also invade the tolerant residents (IT |I),
but this occurs in a much narrower region of the diagram
compared to what happens for Group I and Group II
strategies. As a matter of fact, intolerant mutants only
succeed if they try to invade a minority of tolerant resi-
dents when the rest of the community is intolerant. Fur-
thermore if we start from a society where both subpop-
ulations are intolerant, tolerant mutants have a chance
to invade the minority and spread their strategy (II|T )
—and perhaps eventually turn the community into toler-
ant individuals in the brown region, overlap between II|T
and T |IT invasion regions. Overall, Group III strategies
prove more stable against intolerance.
9FIG. 9. (Color online.) Conditions of ǫ and y under which the invasions T ′|II , I |T ′I and T ′I |T are successful for Ib (left) and
IId (right) strategies. Incentivated cost c′ = 0.
A. Incentives to restore tolerance
As shown in the previous section, if a tolerant
community—or one of the two subpopulations within it—
following a Group I or a Group II strategy eventually
becomes intolerant, there is no way to restore tolerance
again by spreading it among the intolerant individuals.
The only way to achieve this is by “improving the eco-
nomic conditions” (i.e., decreasing ǫ and/or increasing
b/c). An alternative way to generate the same effect could
be introducing an exogenous incentive. We have imple-
mented one such policy through a reduction of the cost of
helping others. In other words, we assume the presence
of a super-agent who partly subsidises the cost of helping
individuals of a subpopulation. This is done by lowering
the cost of helping B-strategists. By assuming this cost
c′ < c, Eqs. (1) turn into
W ′(A|R) = b ΘR,A −Θ
′
A,R,
W ′(M |R) = b ΘR,M −Θ
′
M,R,
(14)
where
Θ′A,R = c θA,A + c
′ θA,B,
Θ′M,R = c θM,A + c
′ θM,B.
(15)
The new scenarios where individuals of a class are given
incentives to help the other class are I|T ′T , T ′|IT , I|T ′I,
and T ′|II, where primes mark individuals who pay the
lower cost c′ for helping the opposite class. Equa-
tions (14) must be used for these individuals, whereas
non-primed individuals follow Eqs. (1), as usual. Intoler-
ant individuals are never marked since they never never
help the opposite class anyway.
From now on we focus only in Groups I and Group II
strategies because tolerant populations following Group
III strategies are intolerance-proof. The most effective
incentive is reached for c′ = 0 (i.e., helping the opposite
class is free). Since strategies belonging to the same group
have a very similar behaviour, we show only one example
for each group in Figs. 9-10.
Starting from a fully intolerant population, we repre-
sent in Fig. 9 the region where incentives are able to
promote tolerance in one of the subpopulation (T ′|II).
Wherever this invasion succeeds, the situation cannot be
reverted, i.e., invasions I|T ′I never occur for the same pa-
rameter values (I|T ′I and regions T ′|II do not overlap).
But on the other hand, intolerant residents in a T ′I pop-
ulation cannot be invaded by tolerant mutants (T ′I|T )
for the same parameter values (again, T ′I|T and T ′|II
regions do not overlap). In other words, if incentives pro-
mote tolerance in one subpopulation of fully intolerant
individuals, the other subpopulation will still resist inva-
sions by tolerant mutants. Incentives are thus not enough
to make a fully tolerant community.
On the other hand, Figure 10 shows that the region
of T ′I|T ′ invasions does overlap with the region of T ′|II
invasions. Thus, by providing incentives to both A and B
groups, there are chances to transform a fully intolerant
community into a fully tolerant one. The latter is also
stable because the region where T ′T ′|I invasions succeed
does not overlap with the T ′I|T ′ region.
Figure 10 also shows that if an II community has been
formed through a sequence of invasions TT → IT → II
from an original TT community, the values of ǫ and y
where this happens are compatible with those for which
full tolerance might be restored through (extreme, i.e.,
c′ = 0) incentives. The extreme case c′ = 0 is not very
realistic, so in general one will have 0 < c′ < c, and the
overlap regions are presumably smaller. But worse than
that is the fact that, as soon as incentives are removed,
the scenarios of Figs. 1–6 are restored and intolerance
takes over again. So the effect of incentives is not perma-
nent.
V. DISCUSSION
We have studied under which conditions intolerance
can invade a tolerant community made of two distinguish-
able subgroups. Our results show differences between two
sets of the stable and coherent strategies known in the lit-
erature of indirect reciprocity as leading eight strategies.
In the first set (Groups I and II) intolerance can invade
a tolerant subpopulation if the action error (which might
associate to lack of resources) is high enough and/or the
benefit-to-cost ratio is low. This invasion is more likely
to occur if the invaded subpopulation is a minority. Once
one of the two subpopulation becomes intolerant, there
is no way to restore tolerance under the same economic
10
FIG. 10. (Color online.) Conditions of ǫ and y under which the invasions T ′|II , T ′I |T ′ and T ′T ′|I are successful for Ib (left)
and IId (right) strategies. Dark (light) line shows the limit of the I |TT (IT |T ) region. Incentivated cost c′ = 0.
conditions. Moreover, if the intolerant minority is large
enough, intolerance can also invade the tolerant minor-
ity. A completely intolerant population cannot return to
tolerance even if economic conditions improve.
If one subpopulation is provided incentives to help the
other, tolerance can be restored for a limited region of
parameters, but the other subpopulation does not turn
to tolerance by invasion. To transform a fully intolerant
community into a fully tolerant one both subpopulations
must be stimulated to help the other. Nonetheless, as
soon as these incentives are removed, intolerance can in-
vade again. Thus, incentives have no permanent effect
unless the economic conditions are simultaneously im-
proved. Incentives may provide a temporary mean to
achieve the goal, but improving the economic conditions
is key to make the effect perdurable.
In the second set of strategies (Group III), a fully toler-
ant population is intolerance-proof. As a matter of fact,
if we start off from a fully intolerant community, tolerant
mutants can invade it much easier than for the first set of
strategies (Groups I and II). The difference between the
second set and the first set—hence the reason why they
resist intolerance—is that the only way for an individual
with bad reputation to achieve a good reputation is if
she helps to another individual with good reputation. In
other words, these strategies are less prone to forgive.
A way to interpret errors in actions is as a measure of
global poverty of the society. If resources are scarce, it
may happen that an individual is forced to deny help that
would otherwise provide. But there may exist alternative
interpretations, e.g., it can also stand as the probability
that an individual is discovered when she secretly tries
to cheat (defect). In this case, the results suggest that
intolerance spreads easier in a society with a high propor-
tion of known fraud. Note that in our model players do
not know the reasons that may drive someone to defect,
i.e., they do not know if a player defects on purpose or
because she lacks the resources for it. The knowledge of
these inner motivations would involve much higher cog-
nitive processes than the simple direct observation that
we are considering here.
In contrast to Nakamura and Masuda [15], we did not
need to make any mean-field approximation since reputa-
tions in our model come directly from the observation of
every interaction. The model we introduced is a simpli-
fied description of very complex behaviours in real world.
In particular, our model considers that the whole society
can be split into two classes whose differentiation is based
only on one set of traits. However many different sets of
traits can differentiate individuals in real life, and differ-
ent people may classify individuals according to different
criteria. Even the relative importance of some of these
traits may change in time [38]. In complex scenarios with
more classes of individuals and different ways to classify
them the results will presumably be different.
The study we have conducted has further limitations.
Apart from the obvious fact that using an indirect reci-
procity model with binary reputation and complete in-
formation certainly oversimplifies the problem (see [39]
and [32] for a discussion of these issues), the main one
is that we have considered only the onset of invasion by
a small fraction of mutants, but not the existence or ab-
sence of mixed equilibria (as can be done, e.g., in direct
reciprocity models [40]). In other words, this study does
not address the more difficult question whether there is a
turn over of the population or a coexistence of strategies.
And definitely simultaneous invasions by different type
of mutants are excluded. There is the implicit assump-
tion that mutants emerge at a rate slower than the time
needed to reach an equilibrium. The existence of mixed
equilibria thus remains an open problem.
These limitations notwithstanding, our study provides
some simple clues that associate the emergence of in-
tolerant attitudes with economic stress and the relative
weight of the subgroups. Remarkably, given the simplic-
ity of the model, economic stress is recognised as one of
the main predictors for the emergence of intolerance [41].
As a matter of fact, this is a typical prediction of so-
cial ‘scapegoat’ theories [42], examples of which are the
research on the increased lynching of American blacks
during times of economic distress [43, 44] and the rise
of fascism and anti-Semitism in Germay during the inter-
war years [45, 46]. Our study also makes some predictions
that are amenable to be tested in real situations, like the
fact that intolerance emerges predominantly within mi-
norities, or—perhaps more importantly—that societies
with a stricter ethics are more resistant to intolerance
than those indulging a relaxed attitude towards defec-
tive behavior of their members. We hope that this work
stimulates empirical studies in these directions.
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Appendix A: Homogeneous populations
It will prove useful to introduce the auxiliary function
U(x1, x2) =
∑
αβ
χα(x1)χβ(x2)Pαβ , (A1)
with χα(x) as defined by (3) and
Pαβ = (1 − ǫ)mαβ(aαβ) + ǫmαβ(D) (A2)
the probability that a donor with reputation α perform-
ing the action aαβ on a recipient with reputation β is
considered good according to the moral rule mαβ(a).
In a homogeneous population—where all its members
belong to same type—the dynamics of the fraction of
good individuals g follows the differential equation
dg
dt
= U(g, g)− g. (A3)
In equilibrium g = U(g, g), a quadratic equation with a
unique stable solution 0 6 g 6 1 [32].
For later convenience, we will consider a continuous
perturbation of the above equation, namely
x = aU(x, x) + 1− a, (A4)
and denote x = p(a) its stable solution in the interval
[0, 1]. Clearly p(1) = g, the solution of the unperturbed
equation.
Another function that we will use later is the solution
of the linear equation x = aU(x, k) + 1− a, 0 6 a, k 6 1,
which can be readily obtained as
x =
1 + a [kP01 + (1 − k)P00 − 1]
1− a [kP11 − (1− k)P10 + kP01 + (1− k)P00]
≡ p˜(k, a).
(A5)
Appendix B: Equilibria for the different scenarios
We must obtain the equilibrium solutions of Eqs. (5)–
(8) in order to compute the probabilities θi,j , which de-
pend on xΛAΛBΛMi . The set of Eqs. (8) is decoupled from
Eqs. (5)–(7), hence xΛA∗ΛMM can be calculated analyti-
cally from Eq. (8) after solving Eqs. (5)–(7). Thus one
can readily obtain gMM and reduce Eq. (8) to a linear sys-
tem of two equations in two unknowns (for example, xG∗GM
and xB∗BM ). In what follows, we describe the processes to
complete our calculations for each different scenario.
1. I |TT scenario
This case considers the possible invasion of a fully tol-
erant resident population by a small fraction of intoler-
ant mutants. Since residents do not distinguish classes,
the resident population acts as a homogeneous popula-
tion. Therefore x∗ΛBΛMi = x
ΛA∗ΛM
i , θB,A = θA,B = θA,A,
θB,M = θA,M , and θM,B = 0. The fraction of good res-
idents is gAB = x
A
A = p(1), as previously discussed. Ac-
cording to the definition of gAA , Eq. (4), we have
xG∗BA = g
A
A − x
G∗G
A , (B1)
xB∗GA = 1− g
A
A − x
B∗B
A . (B2)
Then, the fraction FΛAΛMA,B introduced in Eq. (5) can be
expressed in this scenario as
FΛAΛMA,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
A
A)χβ(g
A
A)P
ΛAΛM
A (αβ), (B3)
PΛAΛMA (αβ) = (1− ǫ) δ (ΛA,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ (ΛM , 1− aαβ)
+ ǫ δ (ΛA,mαβ(D))× δ (ΛM , 1) .
(B4)
Once we numerically solve the two Eqs. (5), Eq. (8),
which corresponds to the intolerant mutants, can be
solved analytically by taking into account that
FΛAΛMM,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
A
M )χβ(g
A
B)P
ΛAΛM
M (αβ), (B5)
PΛAΛMM (αβ) = δ (ΛA,mαβ(D)) δ (ΛM , 1) . (B6)
If at equilibrium, Eq. (8) is summed over ΛA, we find
that gMM is given by p˜(g
M
A , y). Then the set of Eqs. (8)
simplifies to just two equations.
2. T |IT scenario
In this scenario a small fraction of tolerant individuals
tries to invade a population where individuals of their
own class are intolerant (θA,B = 0), whereas those of the
other class are tolerant. Since mutants and B-residents
are both tolerant, they will judge every player equally.
Then xΛAΛB∗i = x
ΛA∗ΛM
i .
The dynamics of the intolerant A-strategists is de-
scribed by Eq. (5), where
FΛAΛMA,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
M
A )χβ(g
M
B )P
ΛAΛM
A (αβ), (B7)
PΛAΛMA (αβ) = δ (ΛM ,mαβ(D)) δ (ΛA, 1) . (B8)
Summing Eqs. (5) over ΛM at equilibrium we obtain
gAA = p(y). In this scenario we also need to calculate
gMB . Since B-mutant’s judgements are the same as those
of B-residents, gMB is given at equilibrium by
gMB = (1− y)U(g
M
B , g
M
B ) + yU(g
M
B , g
A
M ). (B9)
Therefore, we need to solve a system of three equations
(two from Eqs. (5) plus Eq. (B9)), choosing, for instance,
xG∗GA , x
B∗B
A , and g
M
B as unknowns. After solving this
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system numerically, the set of Eqs. (8), where
FΛAΛMM,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
M
M )χβ(g
B
M )P
ΛAΛM
M (αβ) (B10)
PΛAΛMM (αβ) = (1− ǫ) δ (ΛM ,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ (ΛA, 1− aαβ)
+ ǫ δ (ΛM ,mαβ(D))× δ (ΛA, 1) ,
(B11)
can be solved analytically. For that we take into ac-
count that summing over ΛA at equilibrium yields g
M
M =
p˜
(
ygMA + (1− y)g
M
B , 1
)
.
3. I |TI scenario
In this scenario a small fraction of intolerant mutants
tries to invade a population where individuals of their
own class are tolerant whereas those of the other class
are intolerant. Hence θB,A = θB,M = θM,B = 0.
In order to calculate gAB we first need to compute
xΛAΛB∗B through Eq. (6), where
FΛAΛBB,A =
∑
αβ
χα(g
A
B)χβ(g
A
A)P
ΛAΛB
B (αβ), (B12)
PΛAΛBB (αβ) = δ (ΛA,mαβ(D)) δ (ΛB, 1) , (B13)
and summing over ΛA at equilibrium one obtains that
gBB = p(1− y). This way, we reduce the set of Eqs. (6) to
just two equations.
Now, the dynamics of the tolerant individuals is given
by Eq. (5), with
FΛAΛMA,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
A
A)χβ(g
A
B)P
ΛAΛM
A (αβ), (B14)
PΛAΛMA (αβ) = (1− ǫ) δ (ΛA,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ (ΛM , 1− aαβ)
+ ǫ δ (ΛA,mαβ(D))× δ (ΛM , 1) .
(B15)
The only simplification that works in this case is to take
into account that xB∗GA = 1−x
G∗G
A −x
G∗B
A −x
B∗B
A . Thus
we need to solve numerically five coupled equations: three
from Eqs. (5) and two from Eqs. (6), corresponding to the
unknowns xGG∗B , x
BB∗
B , x
G∗G
A , x
G∗B
B , and x
B∗B
B .
The dynamics of the mutants is solved from Eq. (8),
where
FΛAΛMM,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
A
M )χβ(g
A
B)P
ΛAΛM
M (αβ), (B16)
PΛAΛMM (αβ) = δ (ΛA,mαβ(D)) δ (ΛM , 1) . (B17)
Summing over ΛA at equilibrium yields g
M
M = p˜(g
M
A , y),
and transforms the last equation to just two linear equa-
tions.
4. T |II scenario
In this last scenario a small fraction of tolerant mutants
tries to invade a completely intolerant population. Then
θA,B = θB,A = θB,M = 0.
The dynamics for the intolerant A-residents is de-
scribed by Eq. (5) with
FΛAΛMA,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
M
A )χβ(g
M
B )P
ΛAΛM
A (αβ), (B18)
PΛAΛMA (αβ) = δ (ΛM ,mαβ(D)) δ (ΛA, 1) . (B19)
Summing over ΛM at equilibrium yields g
A
A = p(y).
In order to calculate gMB , we need first to compute
x∗ΛBΛMB . The dynamics for these fractions is described
by Eq. (7), where
FΛBΛMB,A =
∑
αβ
χα(g
M
B )χβ(g
M
A )P
ΛBΛM
B (αβ), (B20)
PΛBΛMB (αβ) = δ (ΛM ,mαβ(D)) δ (ΛB, 1) , (B21)
and summing again over ΛM we obtain that g
B
B =
p(1− y). Thus we have four coupled equations (two from
Eqs. (6) and two from Eq. (7)) for the unknowns xG∗GA ,
xB∗BA , x
∗GG
B , and x
∗BB
B , which need to be solved numeri-
cally.
On the other hand, the dynamics of the tolerant mu-
tants is given by Eq. (7), where
FΛAΛMM,B =
∑
αβ
χα(g
M
M )χβ(g
M
B )P
ΛAΛM
M (αβ), (B22)
PΛAΛMM (αβ) = (1− ǫ) δ (ΛM ,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ (ΛA, 1− aαβ)
+ ǫ δ (ΛM ,mαβ(D)) δ (ΛA, 1) .
(B23)
This set of equations can be reduced to just two because
summing over ΛA at equilibrium yields g
M
M = p˜(yg
M
A +
(1 − y)gMB , 1).
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